Open peer commentary on the target article “How and Why the Brain Lays the Foundations for a Conscious Self” by Martin V. Butz. Excerpt: In this commentary to Martin V. Butz’s target article I am especially concerned with his remarks about language (§33, §§71–79, §91) and modularity (§32, §41, §48, §81, §§94–98). In that context, I would like to bring into discussion my own work on computational models of self-monitoring (cf. Neumann 1998, 2004). In this work I explore the idea (...) of an anticipatory drive as a substantial control device for modelling high-level complex language processes such as selfmonitoring and adaptive language use. My work is grounded in computational linguistics and, as such, uses a mathematical and computational methodology. Nevertheless, it might provide some interesting aspects and perspectives for constructivism in general, and the model proposed in Butz’s article, in particular. (shrink)

Cf. Jardine 1974a, p. 29; chapter 6 is 'an elegant account of developments in late scholastic debating exercises' (Jardine 1974b, 33). Cited Van den Burgh, 126 n. 95 re Grotius's method. cit. Mancosu 1996, 232 n. 39.

The Buddhist philosophy of causality is primarily a theory (naya) of the human world. Its methodology, however, is objective and critical. It rejects the weight of mere authority or tradition, relies upon experience and reason, and emphasizes the critical examination and verification of all opinions. Although the Buddhist conception of knowledge and truth has a strong empirical and pragmatic bias (cf. Nyāya‐bindu 1.1), its conception of experience does not exclude introspection, rational intuition or mystical intuition (cf. Nyāya‐bindu 1.7–11). Although its (...) conception of reason creates a logical gulf between reason and experience, the gulf is bridged by a transcendental illusion (avidyā). Its employment of reason is highly analytical and it seeks to discover the ultimate elements constituting the structures of objects and experience. The constituent elements as the locus of causation are regarded as more real than their composite structures – dharma, dhātu or kṣana as contrasted with saṅghāta or santāna. At the same time, it raises dialectical questions and seriously considers the possibility of the empirical world being merely a working illusion. It discounts the apparent stability of objects, stressing their transience, finally defined as momentariness (see, for example, Ratnakīrti's Kṣaṇa‐bhaṅgasiddhi). It rejects the category of substance for that of process. Causality is thus regarded not as a dynamic interaction between substances, but as a functional, many‐one relationship of order characterized by invariance and uniformity within any given type of process. (shrink)

Consecutive waves of paleolithic migrants crossing the Bering land bridge from Siberia to North America between 80,000 and 7,000 b.c. brought with them the shamanic way of harnessing supernatural powers. This way prevailed until the White intrusion 400 years ago, into the living space of the aboriginal peoples of North America. Wherever European political, religious, and economic dominance was established, shamanic institutions became the focus of negative attention. The shamanic practitioner was variously depicted by governmental and ecclesiastic authorities as a (...) charlatan and imposter or a purveyor of evil influence. Some well-known ethnological and medico-psychological experts have until very recently portrayed the shaman as a mentally deranged person whose “primitive” culture permits the acting-out of psychopathology in a prestigious role, a eurocentric and positivistic fallacy rooted in Western misinterpretations of learned behavior manifested during shamanic rituals involving altered states of consciousness. Legal measures to suppress shamanic ceremonials were taken in the United States, especially in the aftermath of the Ghost Dance. This shaman-inspired movement, originating in the Prophet Dance of the Pacific Northwest (Spier 1935), sent waves of hectic sacro-nativistic ceremonial activity through many Amerindian tribes, and finally culminated in the Sioux uprising of 1890 which ended in the tragedy of Wounded Knee (cf. Mooney 1896). (shrink)

Premise: our representational system has had a relatively invariant core throughout human history (cf. Sellars's manifest image). Major theses: (i) When philosophical argument establishes the existence of an entity, that entity is a representing, not a represented. (ii) Most of the documents in the history of philosophy are on a par (as dialogical resources) with current philosophical literature for establishing or controverting such existence claims. (iii) The use of mathematics (initially the mathematized neo-Platonism of classical mechanics) allowed modern physical science (...) to break with the perennial system of representation; in consequence, a portion of the representings of modern physical scientists do not belong to the historically invariant core. This limits the dialogical resources of physical science and the applicability of arguments from perennial philosophy to science. It also explains the relative irrelevance of pre-17th century science to contemporary physical scientists in contrast to the relevance of pre-17th century philosophy to contemporary philosophers. It also supports thesis (iv), that logic (broadly conceived) in central to all serious philosophical enterprises, since logic is the central tool for exhibiting and criticizing the rationale(s) of our representational system(s). Support for these theses will be found in the paper. (shrink)

H. G. Liddell & R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, rev. and aug. by Sir H. S. Jones. with the ass. of R. McKenzie, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940. ῥυθμός , Ion. ῥυσμός (v. infr. 111, IV), ὁ : (ῥέω) :— A. any regular recurring motion (“πᾶς ῥ. ὡρισμένῃ μετρεῖται κινήσει” Arist.Pr.882b2) : I. measured motion, time, whether in sound or motion, Democr.15c ; = ἡ τῆς κινήσεως τάξις, Pl.Lg.665a, cf. 672e ; “ὁ ῥ. ἐκ τοῦ ταχέος (...) - Études grecques et (...) latines. (shrink)

Discussions concerning belief revision, theorydevelopment, and ``creativity'' in philosophy andAI, reveal a growing interest in Peirce'sconcept of abduction. Peirce introducedabduction in an attempt to providetheoretical dignity and clarification to thedifficult problem of knowledge generation. Hewrote that ``An Abduction is Originary inrespect to being the only kind of argumentwhich starts a new idea'' (Peirce, CP 2.26).These discussions, however, led to considerabledebates about the precise way in which Peirce'sabduction can be used to explain knowledgegeneration (cf. Magnani, 1999; Hoffmann, 1999).The crucial question is (...) that of understandinghow we can get the new elements capableof enlarging our theories. Under thesecircumstances, it might be helpful to step outof the entanglement and reconsider the basis ofthe problem that originally triggered Peirce'sinterest in abduction. This will lead us toanother Peircean concept, that of ``diagrammaticreasoning,'' which I discuss here in the contextof his ``pragmatism.'' In this way, I hope toreach a better understanding of thecontribution of ``abduction'' to the knowledgegeneration process. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Minerva Rava An Torva?Anastasios G. Nikolaidis1. Ovid Ars 2.659: Si paeta est, Veneri similis, si torva, Minervaetorva Merkel: flava R in marg. cum plerisque codd.: rava Heinsius: parva R cum aliquot dett.: fulva F.2. Priapea 36.4: Minerva torvo lumine est, Venus paetotorvo scripsi: flavo libri edd. vett.: flava et post hoc verbum commate interpunxit De Rooy (probant Vollmer, Clairmont, Parker): ravo Haupt: glauco Antonius.IMost codices for line 2.659 of (...) Ovid's Ars amatoria give flava in place of torva, but this reading does not suit the context (Ovid is suggesting ways of moderating the flaws of one's puella), which requires a word with a negative connotation.1 Among the proposed emendations, Heinsius' rava has been adopted by almost all editors of the Ars, but the elusive meaning of this adjective, in conjunction with its very limited use by the Latin poets and some other considerations that I explore below, allow us to look at this emendation afresh. In fact, apart from its appearance in the two lines under discussion, ravus seems to have been employed only on two other occasions, and only by Horace; and in one of them it is not the only codices reading (see note 11 below).2As a color term, ravus suggests a grey-yellowish or grey-bluish tinge, which corresponds to the implications of the Greek.3 The Greek word, however, was more extensively employed (see the respective [End Page 81] entries in LSJ and OLD) and more varied in meaning. With reference to eyes, for example, charopos appears to denote either the color of the iris (mostly in prose) or the flash, the glow of the gaze (nearly always in poetry; see note 5), which in turn may be due either to exuberant joy4 or-albeit not as frequently-to unrestrained fury.5 It appears, however, that in reference to human eyes charopos is a more or less complimentary term,6 whereas in reference to the eyes of animals, it carries rather negative overtones, whether it describes the color of the eyes or thegleam in them.7 We can thus account for the last explanation of charopos in Hesychius' Lexicon (). It seems that the connotation of the fierce glare, the awe-inspiring gaze, passed, at least to a small extent (see references in LSJ), from animals to humans, so that in a Lucian passage the goddess Athena is disparagingly depicted as charope (Dial. deor. 23.1: ).8 [End Page 82]It would follow, then, that rava, as applied to Minerva in the Ars amatoria passage, cannot refer to the color connotations of charopos (for these are positive)9 but only to the notion of a fierce glare, as is indeed appropriate to the warlike Athena.10 It may not be accidental, after all, that just before the first appearance of Athena in Homer (A 206), it is the glaring eyes of the goddess, not their color, that we encounter: (A 200; cf. Eustathius's commentary).11 On the other hand, one could argue that the eye color that the Greeks liked (charopon) was one that the Romans disliked (in which case rava would be appropriate), but the only evidence for this comes from the two passages we are discussing here.12 [End Page 83]In my view, the shortcoming in the puella that Ovid wants moderated is her grim, sullen countenance, her glaring look, not the color of her eyes. This is somewhat corroborated by the paeta of the first hemistich (again a kind of look, not color)13 and the comparison with Athena, who, as a war goddess, would have looked fierce. Yet, the adjective rava is not only used nowhere else by Ovid in any context;14 it is never attributed to Athena/Minerva/Pallas throughout Latin poetry.15 Even in Lucretius 4.1161, where the context is almost identical with that of Ars amatoria 2.659, Athena is only indirectly described as caesia (which translates see Aul. Gell. 2.26.19 and cf. André 1949, 178f.), a quality that is actually never attributed to Minerva by Latin poets (see Carter 1902, 113).16 By contrast, the adjective torvus... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume, Shaftesbury, and the Peirce-James Controversy EDMUND G. HOWELLS I. ACCORDING TO HUME, the "religious hypothesis" is "a particular method of accounting for the visible phenomena of the universe''1 that is "mere conjecture and hypothesis," (Enquiry, 145) and "both uncertain and useless" (Enquiry, 142). But there was one version of this hypothesis that seemed to pose particular difficulties for him in making these claims convincing. This was Shaftesbury 's (...) view of the world as the object of "divine passion." Besides Shaftesbury's massive influence at the time, Hume was wrestling with the peculiar disadvantage of having agreed with him on so many points, particularly in the attempt to solve the problem of personal identity. He attempted to discredit Shaftesbury's "particular method" on several levels: viz., it cannot be rationally justified, deductively or inductively ; it is not really a belief, so afortiori it is not a natural belief; to the extent it is confused with a genuine belief, its effects are very rare and transitory unless it degenerates into superstition or enthusiasm, which are demonstrably pernicious. 2 These attacks were frequently reinforced with arguments ad hominem. Shaftesbury's theism is extremely ambiguous. In the Essay Concerning Virtue or Merit he pronounced, "to believe therefore that everything is governed, ordered, or regulated for the best, by a designing principle or mind, necessarily good or permanent, is to be a perfect theist" (CH I:240). This is merely the least common denominator of what all eighteenth-century natural theologians agreed could be inferred a posteriori from some form of design argument. Shaftesbury used several analogies to support this view, each based upon a comparison of a part of the universe to the whole:(l) an artifact, for example, a watch (CH I: 190), a ship (CH i Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge,2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902),p. 139;hereafter cited as Enquiry. The quotes in my opening statement are technically not from Hume himself but from his "sceptical friend who lovesparadoxes." But the closest Hume comes to a single refutation of all forms of the "religious hypothesis," comparable to Cleanthes' "entirely decisive" refutation of Demea's version of the ontological argument (Dialogues, 189),is stated by Hume in his own person in the final paragraph of this section (Enquiry, XI). Other abbreviations used in this paper are: Treatisefor.4 Treatiseof Human Nature, ed. L. A. SelbyBigge {Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949);Abstract for An Abstract of a Treatiseof Human Nature, 1740, ed. J. M. Keynesand P. Sraffa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938);G&G for David Hume: The Philosophical Works, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 4 vols. (London, 1886); Dialogues for Dialogues ConcerningNatural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947); Letters for The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Grieg, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932); CH for Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. J. M. Robertson, 2 vols. (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill, 1964). A roman numeral followed by a colon denotes volume; other roman numerals denote parts or sections; arabic numbers denote pages. 2For a striking exampleof one of their many points of agreement cf. Hume's essay(G&G 111: 144-150) with CH 11: 178-180. [4491 450 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY II:66), "a pile of regular architecture" (CH II:66-67), is to the artisan as the universe is to God. (2) A work of art, for example, a symphony (CH II :66), is to the artist as the universe is to God. (3) An organ is to the organism as the organism or species is to the teleologically structured and intelligent whole (CH I:243ff.) 3 (4) Microcosm (man) to Macrocosm (God), that is, man's mind is the governing principle over the other parts of his nature as God's mind is to the universe: though "all else may be only dream and shadow. All which even sense suggests may be deceitful.... Reason subsists." We are "in a manner conscious" that our reason is part of the pervasive world soul which inhabits our own, and "all nature's wonders serve to excite and perfect this idea of their author" (CH II : 112). In keeping with... (shrink)

For purposes of this paper, a conscious state is a mental state whose subject is directly or at least nonevidentially aware of being in it. (The state does not count as conscious if the subject has only been told about it by a cognitive scientist or psychologist; introspectively would be better, but no one should say that a state is conscious only if its subject actively introspects it.). N.b., this usage is only one among several quite different though of course (...) not competing ones; the phrase has been used in at least two other senses, as by, respectively, Dretske (1993, 1995) and Block (1995).1 My definition is stipulative, but not brutely so; it settles on one thing that is often meant by conscious state cf. a conscious memory, a conscious desire, a conscious intention, a conscious decision. According to higher-order (HO) theories of consciousness in this sense of consciousness, what makes a mental state a conscious one is that it is represented by another of the subject’s mental states, that in virtue of which s/he is aware of it. Some practitioners follow Locke in taking the higher-order state to be quasi-perceptual (Armstrong, 1968, 1980, Lycan 1991, 1996); others say it may be merely a thought about the original state (Rosenthal, 1986, 1990).2 There is an alleged objection to such theories, that originated with Goldman (1993)Error: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMap3 and has since been voiced and discussed by others (Dretske 1995, Stubenberg 1998, Van Gulick 2000, 2005, Gennaro 2005, Kriegel 2009). I say alleged, because. (shrink)

*These notes were folded into the published paper "Probability and nonclassical logic*. Revising semantics and logic has consequences for the theory of mind. Standard formal treatments of rational belief and desire make classical assumptions. If we are to challenge the presuppositions, we indicate what is kind of theory is going to take their place. Consider probability theory interpreted as an account of ideal partial belief. But if some propositions are neither true nor false, or are half true, or whatever—then it’s (...) far from clear that our degrees of belief in it and its negation should sum to 1, as classical probability theory requires (?, cf.). There are extant proposals in the literature for generalizing (categorical) probability theory to a non-classical setting, and we will use these below. But subjective probabilities themselves stand in functional relations to other mental states, and we need to trace the knock-on consequences of revisionism for this interrelationship (arguably, degrees of belief only count as kinds of belief in virtue of standing in these functional relationships). (shrink)

A liberalism which scorns all individualism is fundamentally misguided. This is the chief thesis of this paper. To argue for it, I look closely at some key concepts. The concepts of morislity and individualism are crucial. I emphasize Dewey on the "individuality of the mind" and a Deweyan discussion of language, communication, and community. The thesis links individualism and liberalism, and since appeals to liberalism have broader appeal in the present context of discussions, I start with consideration of liberalism. The (...) aim is to dispute overly restrictive conceptions and explore a broader perspective. To bring the argument to a close, attention turns first to Dewey on value inquiry, to Dewey's "democratic individualism" (cf. Dewey 1939, 179), and to the concept of moral community. Disputing the acquisitiveness of utilitarian influences in classical liberalism, a Deweyan argument from the nature of moral community supports re-emphasis on individualism in contemporary liberal thought. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.4 (2002) 639-658 [Access article in PDF] "The whole exercise of reason":Charles Mein's Account of Rationality James G. Buickerood L'Auteur de cet Ouvrage nous paroit meriter un rang distingué parmi les Auteurs Metaphysiques. Il seroit seulement à souhaiter qu'il eût traité ses matiéres avec un peu plus de Methode. Ce n'est pas qu'il ne soit très-intelligible, & que son Stile même ne soit (...) assez pur, mais un Auteur devroit se souvenir que ceux qui liront son ouvrage ne suivront pas ses pensées comme il les suit, & qu'on ne se rapellera pas ce qu'il a dit aussi facilement qu'il se le rapelle lui-même.... Il nous paroit que si l'Auteur veut encore s'exercer sur pareilles matieres il ne fera pas mal de repasser sur ce qui'il vient de publier, de donner des definitions plus intelligibles, & d'éclaircir le reste avec plus d'exactitude. — Bibliothèque raisonnée, June 1729 Two Dissertations concerning Sense, and the Imagination. With an Essay on Consciousness appeared anonymously in mid-summer 1728 over the prestigious imprint of Tonson in the Strand. 1 The "Essay on Consciousness" explicates the nature and functions of consciousness. The two dissertations modestly prepare for an inquiry into human understanding, which [End Page 639] is at present very much wanted; and towards which the removal of those Prejudices arising from Sense, and the Imagination, which hinder Men from discovering the Truth, or discerning it, tho' fairly offered to them, is the first Step to be made; and may be of some use to any one who shall hereafter undertake to explain and set forth, in a clear and perspicuous Light, the native and genuine Operations of the Understanding, as they are in Themselves, without mixing or confounding them with any Others. (1-2) A Bibliothèque raisonnée review twice noted the book's diffusion and inconvenient organization. 2 The book is nonetheless interesting for its clear defense of the cognitive superiority of reason over sense and imagination, its attack on contemporary conflations of human and brutal natures, and its treatment of consciousness, dreams, madness, and the self. In its assay of human understanding Two Dissertations implements Peripatetic, Cartesian, and even Lockean principles. The last notwithstanding, the work is an assault on the Lockean reduction of understanding to passive perception and on Locke's conception of knowledge as the perception of ideas and their relations. It is also an attempt to resuscitate reason in the teeth of nominalist accounts of rationality such as those of John Toland and allied freethinkers. 3 In pursuing these goals, it offers variations on traditional concepts of cognition, such as a conception of notions as acts of intellectual apprehension which an interpreting mind brings to bear on sensory appearances. This understanding of notions as acts falls within the British notional way marked by Digby, White, Sergeant, and especially Burthogge, antedating publication of George Berkeley's explicit distinction between passive ideas and notions owing to reflection. 4 Notions play an important role in Two Dissertations, contrasting the mind's active, rational contribution to knowledge with Lockean ideas. Yet the work's treatment of notions contains intimations of a more elaborate conception of rationality that includes a distinct order of reflective notions not deployed in this book (25-26).Clearly identifying the purposes, doctrine, and authorship of Two Dissertations is worthwhile insofar as its detailed analysis of consciousness is intrinsically interesting and quite possibly historically important, despite its neglect in the past century. For its "Essay on Consciousness" purports to be the "first Attempt that hath been made on the Subject" (sig. A3r ; cf. 141-42). While conventional [End Page 640] interpretations of modern philosophy may have habituated us to be skeptical of such a claim made as late as 1728, it is by no means outlandish, subject to textual and conceptual qualification. This paper concerns primarily just one function of the conscious mind addressed in Two Dissertations: the concept of... (shrink)

Así como en lo que respecta al análisis político del presente cabe afirmar que no podrá ofrecérsenos éste nunca bajo una figura acabada o una perfecta interrupción en la idealizada plenitud del tiempo, no es menos cierto que hay escrituras y análisis del presente político que persiguen envolver figuras certeras de instantes limitados y, por ello, perfectos. Si el ámbito de la política «exige el presente como tema y problema» (como afirma el autor en su introducción, cf. p. 13), el (...) desafío de la escritura en torno a los problemas filosóficos a través de los cuales pensar certeramente la actualidad de la política puede afrontarse, entre otros lugares, desde la complejidad de la escritura. Así es, hay ensayos en los que se aprecia la voluntad de escritura de su autor, el gusto por una sobriedad que no desdeñe una actitud prolija y generosa —como la del pintor impresionista que pincela sus propias pinceladas para dotarlas de una forma de espesor que sólo cabe adquirir por medio de lo que, en el campo del pensamiento, se llama reflexión— con las posibilidades de la lengua: frases cortas cuyo rigor semántico no radica únicamente en la expresión directa de una idea sino, por ejemplo, en la elección de un verbo que encierre varios sentidos, o en la intercalación de un paréntesis que obligue a deambular al lector hacia el camino opuesto por el que ya marchaba; o bien, por el contrario, inclinándose hacia lo múltiple, el pliegue barroco y la expresión suya bajo subordinadas en las que se hilvana, junto a la idea, un recorrido posible para ésta: diseñado conforme a su complejidad, polisemia, inestabilidad, intempestividad o, incluso, su crudeza y su ironía. A mi modo de ver, Política mente. De la revolución a la globalización da buena cuenta de esa voluntad de estilo. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:102 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY historical circumstances a suprahistorical, eternal significance, and that a historian or interpreter of a philosophy will do it justice only if he grasps this lasting truth and content, in addition to comparing it with the opinions of other earlier or later thinkers. One cannot see how a thinker who considered Plato as valid while treating him and others historically could have arrived at a different (...) conclusion. But it is a position admirably expressed that would deserve greater attention and a wider following among the present practitioners of the history of philosophy. Hoffmann's method and style in this, as in most of his other writings, deserve the highest praise, for he combines simplicity with density. His manner of expression reflects his commitment to truth (a commitment curiously omitted by many contemporary existentialists), and the integrity of his character: Hoffmann was one of the few German scholars who made no concessions to Nazism because he was a faithful representative of that German tradition which was incompatible with Nazism: classical humanism in its scholarly, literary and educational meaning, philosophical idealism, and liberal protestantism. Guided by Plato, Kant and Goethe, Hoffmann was untouched by the Romantic and nationalistic strands of German thought. His work transmits to us the precious heritage of a life completely devoted to philosophy and to scholarship, and of an important period in the history of German thought. He omits many things which we have learned in the last few years, or which we may still learn through future studies. Yet he can teach us many important things that are too easily forgotten in our present discussions: the role of Platonism in the history of philosophy and of the sciences, and the fundamental impact of ancient philosophy upon early Christian, medieval and modern thought. It is a heritage which we should try to enlarge, if we can, but also strive to preserve, and to keep alive. PAUL OSKARKRISTELLER Columbia University Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle. By Philip Merlan. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz [Klassisch-Philologische Studien, Heft 22], 1960. Pp. viii + 112. P1. 4. DM 12.--) Ever since the publication in 1936 of Bignone's L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro there have been attempts to define the exact nature of the debt which Epicurus owes to the Peripatos. In this collection of essays, the author of From Platonism to Neoplatonism turns his keen powers of analysis upon a number of specific problems deriving from Plato's Laws and carrying us via Aristotle's Metaphysics and Ethics to Epicurus's theology and beyond. In the first chapter, "Hedone in Epicurus and Aristotle," the author takes us on a generous stroll through hedonist materials, BOOK REVIEWS 103 including an ode by Schiller, to explore the precise meaning of the term hedone. More especially he is concerned to show how close the Epicurean understanding of the term is to that of Aristotle in at least some of his writings, notably Protrepticus and Nic. Eth. H and Met. A. The results of this investigation may be stated in the author's own words: Whether it occurs in Epicurus or in Aristotle, the term hedone can mean anything between gross sensual "pleasure" and entirely spiritual "joy." And on the whole it seems preferable to speak of the philosophy of Epicurus as a philosophy of joy rather than of pleasure. As far as Aristotle is concerned, it seems more appropriate to say that his Changeless Changer (or Changeless Changers) live a life that is filled with joy rather than pleasure, and that his hedonism is ultimately rooted in that of Eudoxus. Chapter 2, "How Many Kinds of Divinities Did Epicurus Recognize?," argues from the theory of the existence of indiscernible non-identicals (Cicero,4cademica 2.17.55; Philodemus De Pietate col. 80 = fr. 40 Us.) and from the theory of "isonomia," i.e., the balancing of one class of things by an equally large class of a different or opposite character (cf. C. Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 461 ff.) that the Epicureans recognized two types of worshippables, as is indeed suggested by schol. Diog. Laert. 10.139: (I) the popular traditional divinities who are kar arithmon, i.e., severally unique, and... (shrink)

Analyses in detail the accounts given respectively by Locke and by Hume of the mental factors such as pleasure, pain, uneasiness, and desire, which they see as causing all human actions. Foot argues that this enterprise was misconceived. Philosophers should no more try to describe a mechanism underlying acting on a reason (as e.g. a prudential or moral reason) than a mechanism underlying believing on a reason. Practical and theoretical reasoning are here on a par, the first issuing in action (...) and the second in belief. (shrink)

Given the ever-present subject of consciousness wherever consciousness is, it is peculiar that consciousness researchers often mention mental states as if they are conscious independently of being the conscious states of someone [1, p. 132]. We refer to visual perceptions that become conscious, when in reality no one has ever studied mere conscious visual perceptions. What are studied are visual perceptions belonging to conscious human or animal subjects; it is the subjects who are conscious of visual stimuli, not the visual (...) perceptions. I do not know all the reasons why conscious subjects are rarely mentioned in consciousness science, but one could be pragmatic. Explaining the mysterious jump from the nonconscious nuts and bolts of neurons to the aurora borealis of consciousness is a hard problem. But it is an easy problem compared to explaining the emergence of a single conscious subject from the human brain’s 86 billion neurons [cf. 5]. Perhaps it is more practically realistic to solve the less hard problem before attempting to solve the harder hard problem. On the other hand, if we ignore a necessary condition for the presence of consciousness, our explanations of it could be plagued by inadequacy. And how can we explain our whole data set regarding consciousness if we neglect the most fundamental aspect of the data? (shrink)

Las fuentes principales para la reconstrucción de la teoría del conocimiento de Hegel en su Sistema maduro son la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo y la Lógica subjetiva o Lógica del Concepto. En este respecto, la filosofía del Espíritu Absoluto ocupa en principio, dentro de la estrategia general adoptada por Hegel para exponer su pensamiento gnoseológico, un lugar periférico; sin embargo, toda vez que las formas del Espíritu Absoluto, esto es, el Arte, la Religión y la Filosofía, son para Hegel resultados (...) de la progresiva explicitación del tipo de contenidos que implica la lógica interna de los sucesivos actos cognitivos del sujeto, en el marco de la exposición de la filosofía del Espíritu Absoluto Hegel desarrolla y precisa ulteriormente su teoría general sobre los actos de conocimiento. En este contexto, el tratamiento del concepto de la religión en las lecciones berlinesas sobre filosofía de la religión ofrece una oportunidad privilegiada -por regla general inadvertida- para profundizar en el análisis de las reflexiones de Hegel sobre el fenómeno del conocimiento humano. En sus cuatro cursos berlineses -1821, 1824, 1827 y 1831- sobre filosofía de la religión, Hegel divide a esta disciplina en tres partes, a saber: el Concepto de la Religión, la Religión Determinada y la Religión Consumada; en la primera de esas partes, esto es, en la que dedica al concepto de la religión, Hegel desarrolla las diferentes formas subjetivas de la conciencia religiosa sin considerar su contenido (de su contenido versarán las dos partes siguientes), es decir, analiza los actos cognitivos del sujeto de un modo puramente formal, tal como lo había hecho antes en el marco de la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo. En esta medida, la exposición del concepto de la religión ofrece una verdadera filosofía del espíritu subjetivo en compendio en la que se retoman, pero también se complementan las tesis expuestas en la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo -más precisamente, en la Psicología- en sentido estricto. El objetivo de nuestro trabajo es analizar la teoría de los actos de conocimiento presente en las Lecciones sobre Filosofía de la Religión; en razón de los requisitos de extensión que debe cumplir este trabajo, nos limitaremos a analizar los desarrollos que Hegel ofrece en el manuscrito que usa como texto base para el dictado de su primera Lección sobre Filosofía de la Religión en el semestre de verano de 1821 (cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte. Bd. 3. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. 1. Einleitung und Begriff der Religion, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1983, pp. 95-163). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:DESIRE FOR HAPPINESS AND THE COMMANDMENTS IN THE FIRST CHAPTER OF VER/TATIS SPLENDOR* LIVIO MELINA Pontijicio Istituto Giovanni Paolo II Rome, Italy ' ' THE DESIRE for happiness" and "the commandments " seem to constitute two irreducible alternatives, representing a contrariety that separates the classical conception of morality from the modern. The choice that Catholic post-Tridentine handbook theology made to remove the treatise on happiness from moral theology and (...) to focus on the commandments appears unavoidable, even to contemporary moral theology. The perspective of the desire for happiness, which is thought to bind the ethical imperative to an empirical element that is indeterminate, subjective, and, above all, self-interested, has been eliminated from the ambit of moral thinking as incapable of guaranteeing the absolute and unconditional character of morality. This has been achieved by means of a philosophical critique 1 that appears not to have lost currency and persuasiveness. Moreover, from a theological point of view, the perspective of the desire for happiness seems unwittingly to risk turning God, the end of all, into the means of"my" self-realization.2 Faithfulness to Biblical inspiration, rather than to an Aristotelian schema, seems necessarily to privilege the commandments as the original form of morality.3 ' Translated by Margaret Harper McCarthy. 1 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981), 7-43. 2 Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Homo creatus est," in Homo creatus est, vol. 5 of Skizzen zur Theologie (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1986), 9-26. 3 Cf. G. Angelini, Il senso orientato al sapere: L'etica come questione teologica, in G. Colombo, ed., L'evidenza e lafede (Milan, 1988), 387-443, esp. 414-19. 341 342 LIVIO MELINA It is therefore surprising to note how the Encyclical Veritatis splendor, in its evocative rereading of the dialogue between Jesus and the young rich man (in Mt. 19:16-21), reintroduces the category of the "desire for happiness," cha~~cterizing it as proper content for moral inquiry. The Encyclical also, however, associates this perspective wjth that of the commandments when it cites the response of Jesus, who, after having invited the rich man to turn his gaze toward the One who alone is good, directs the young man to observe the Decalogue. This is not simply a juxtaposition of different and mutually incompatible perspectives. While it is not obliged to provide a theoretical and systematic justification, the papal document does solicit attempts to grasp the constitutive connections that would provide for an integration of these two categories; this is specifically the task of the moral theologian. Thus, when the Encyclical suggests that the question about happiness-as the question "about the full meaning of life," and as prior to the question "about rules to be followed"-is the "echo of a call from God who is the origin and end of man's life" (n. 7), it situates itself within the perspective of the renewal to which the Second Vatican Council called moral theology, which, in its theoretical exposition, will have the task of illustrating "the lofty vocation which the faithful have received in Christ, the only response fully capable of satisfying the desire of the human heart" (n. 7).4 This article intends to accept the invitation of the Encyclical and the Council by thematizing the relation between the desire for happiness and the commandments. Starting from the indications of the first chapter of Veritatis splendor, moral theology is called to establish this relation at a fundamental level. I shall develop my reflection on this theme in three stages. In the first place, I shall present an examination of the three terms at issue (desire, happiness, and commandments) with the intention of grasping the similarities and dissimilarities between them. In the second place I shall take up the global context within which Veritatis splendor situates the relation between these terms, and which is provided by the link between freedom and truth. 4 Cf. The Decree on Priestly Formation, Optatam totius, n. 16. DESIRE FOR HAPPINESS AND THE COMMANDMENTS 343 Finally, the specific theme of the first chapter of the Encyclical will be put into relief by displaying the novel points of departure of... (shrink)

Assume G.C.H. We prove that for singular λ, □ λ implies the diamonds hold for many $S \subseteq \lambda^+$ (including $S \subseteq \{\delta:\delta \in \lambda^+, \mathrm{cf}\delta = \mathrm{cf}\delta = \mathrm{cf}\lambda\}$ . We also have complementary consistency results.

In the Consolation of Philosophy, Lady Philosophy leads Boethius through a series of obstacles that prevent him from finding happiness within his prison cell: the role that luck and misfortune play in our affairs, the false paths to happiness in comparison with the true journey, the problem of evil and the disproportion between people’s lives and eschatological deserts, and, finally, whether God’s providential order necessitates our outcomes or if we can choose freely to pursue the happy life. As the pair (...) discuss each problem, the same argumentative move and countermove play out. Boethius, forgetful of what he had learned from Philosophy long ago on account of his grief, blames the very nature of reality itself for each of the problems that beset him. He thinks that Fortune has taken from him all that is good and that God’s providence only extends to the non-human world. Philosophy, by contrast, argues in each case that the problem at hand is, in fact, no problem at all when we see reality rightly. In each case, Philosophy shows that it isn’t reality that’s to blame for the problem at hand but instead human ignorance’s misunderstanding of the true nature of reality. Boethius’s conversation with Philosophy showcases a puzzling feature of self-knowledge: on the one hand, too much attention to the world (e.g., fortune’s wiles) is the problem and self-inquiry (e.g., the nature of one’s desires) is the solution, but on the other hand, too much attention to one’s self (e.g., attention to passions and limitations) is the problem and turning toward recognizing the true structure of the world is the solution. Philosophy seems to indicate that both poles are true, and the task is to determine how best to clarify how. After showcasing the dialogue’s argumentative pattern, I argue that, in Boethius’s case, each of his problems, as well as his misery in general, are caused by his ignorance and self-deception. Boethius’s ignorance is, in this case, the more proximate cause of his misery, but underlying his ignorance is an act of self-deception that causes him to be ignorant in the first place. As Philosophy tells Boethius early on, he already knows what she plans to teach him (more accurately, of what she plans to remind him). Nevertheless, he has forgotten what he has known and, as a result, is more the architect of his own misery than is Fortune or any of the events that have befallen him. Wounded by grief, he has allowed his affective response to his misfortune to becloud his understanding. As Philosophy says, he is unhappy because he has “forgotten what he is.” He has forgotten himself precisely because of the way in which he has allowed his affective responses to rule in his soul. Hence, while the ultimate cure for Boethius’s misery will be a newly rediscovered knowledge that reality itself is providentially structured, Philosophy must begin by soothing Boethius’s passions and undoing the damage that they have wrought on his understanding of the world. Philosophy cannot turn Boethius’s intellect until she has first turned his passions (cf. Republic 518b-d), which, while still wrongly-turned and governing the soul, are liable to lead to tremendous intellectual mistakes precisely because they are blind to the true nature of reality (cf. Phaedrus 247c). I argue in conclusion that the Consolation is unified by the theme of self-deception as the primary cause of philosophical misery. Boethius is upset primarily because he has convinced himself that he is otherwise than he is and that reality is otherwise than it is rather than because of what has happened to him, contrary to his own view of things. Philosophy’s argumentative strategy suggests that self-deception can only be undone by attending to it as a problem besetting the whole soul, not just the intellectual part of the soul. We thus have good warrant for thinking that simply rational responses to ignorance will be fruitless when ignorance is caused by or accompanied by a moral failing. (shrink)

It can be argued (cf. Dizadji‑Bahmani et al. 2010) that an increase in coherence is one goal that drives reductionist enterprises. Consequently, the question if or how well this goal is achieved can serve as an epistemic criterion for evaluating both a concrete case of a purported reduction and our model of reduction : what conditions on the model allow for an increase in coherence ? In order to answer this question, I provide an analysis of the relation between the (...) reduction and the coherence of two theories. The underlying model of reduction is a (generalised) Nagelian model (cf. Nagel 1970, Schaffner 1974, Dizadji‑Bahmani et al. 2010). For coherence, different measures have been put forward (e.g. Shogenji 1999, Olsson 2002, Fitelson 2003, Bovens & Hartmann 2003). However, since there are counterexamples to each proposed coherence measure, we should be careful that the analysis be sufficiently stable (in a sense to be specified). It will turn out that this can be done. (shrink)

• Session on CF&FCT proposed by E. Landry; participants: G. Hellman, E. Landry, J.-P. Marquis and C. McLarty..

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander. Vol. II. Commentary on Books IV–VPhilip A. StadterBosworth, A. B. A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander. Vol. II. Commentary on Books IV–V. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.In books 1–3, Arrian’s Alexander rushed from the Hellespont to Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis. In books IV and V the story changes: Alexander finds himself on the frontier, and beyond. No longer is (...) he confronting the enormous armies of the Persian king in set battles, but pushing beyond the frontiers of empire, seizing impregnable heights, and most important, struggling with his own Macedonians while defining himself.Bosworth, continuing his commentary after a fifteen-year interval, brings an exceptional background of historical, source critical, and literary studies. B. notes that his evaluation is “perhaps more sympathetic” than in his first volume, in part because the quality of the work “improves as it progresses” (v). The thoroughness [End Page 140] of the discussion (360 pages on the two books) is justified by the importance and complexity of the material. The reader is well served by an excellent subject index, a Greek index, ten maps, and four figures. An appendix on Nearchus suggests that that author may have reported much more than the journey from the Indus to the Persian Gulf found in the Indike, and may be a significant source for Arrian in the last four books of the Alexander history. Like the first volume, the commentary has Greek lemmata, translated only when there is a specific difficulty, but even Greekless readers can use it with the help of Brunt’s new Loeb text.Although the commentary deals frequently with textual questions, it focuses on elucidating the historical, geographical, stylistic, and interpretative problems of the text. B. ably notes the constant verbal reminiscences of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, especially in the more elaborate passages, e.g., the speeches at the Hyphasis. Still more are undoubtedly to be found, such as the echo of Thucydides (1.110.1, 3.112.8, 87.87.6) in 5.27.6, ¹l¼goi ¨k poll©n. His elucidation of Arrian’s use of Megasthenes, Nearchus, and Eratosthenes in the digressions at the beginning of book 5 is a model of clarity and precision. Here as elsewhere he stresses Arrian’s purposeful blending of his sources: e.g., on 5.6.3–8: “It is an elaborately contrived passage, and the source material is carefully selected to fit the scheme of the argument. Arrian is not merely rewriting a passage of Eratosthenes.” Throughout, his comments on sources are precise and thoughtful.B.’s notes follow wherever the text leads, but he devotes special attention to the major focuses of Arrian’s attention: the great digression on Alexander’s orientalism, the murder of Cleitus, proskunesis, and the page’s conspiracy (4.7.4–14.4 5 45–101), the march to the Indus, with the siege of Massaga and the capture of Aornus (4.22.3–30.9 5 141–96), the series of digressions which begin book 5, (5.1.1–8.1 5 197–259), the battle on the Hydaspes against Porus (5.8.4–19.4 5 262–311), and the mutiny on the Hyphasis (5.24.8–29.5 5 337–60).Bosworth’s commentary on book 5 encompasses the multiple levels of the narrative: the reworking of Eratosthenes, Megasthenes, and Nearchus in the preliminary section; the topographical and tactical problems of the battle with Porus, and the rhetorical and stylistic subtleties of the debate at the Hyphasis. Throughout the book, Arrian shows Alexander going beyond his predecessors. By crossing the Indus he passes the limits of the Persian Empire. At Nysa he surpasses the mythical conquests of Dionysus (5.2.1). The digression on the Indus bridges recalls the bridges (and defeats) of Xerxes and Darius, as well as Roman imperial engineering (5.7.1–2). The crossing of the Hydaspes and great battle contrast with Cyrus’ disastrous battle with the Massagetae in Herodotus 1.204–14 (cf. 5.4.5). The description of the river systems of the Punjab (5.4.1–2) evokes Herodotus’ account... (shrink)

Quillen [17] introduced model categories as an abstract framework for homotopy theory which would apply to a wide range of mathematical settings. By all accounts this program has been a success and—as, e.g., the work of Voevodsky on the homotopy theory of schemes [15] or the work of Joyal [11, 12] and Lurie [13] on quasicategories seem to indicate—it will likely continue to facilitate mathematical advances. In this paper we present a novel connection between model categories and mathematical logic, inspired (...) by the groupoid model of (intensional) Martin–Löf type theory [14] due to Hofmann and Streicher [9]. In particular, we show that a form of Martin–Löf type theory can be soundly modelled in any model category. This result indicates moreover that any model category has an associated “internal language” which is itself a form of Martin-Löf type theory. This suggests applications both to type theory and to homotopy theory. Because Martin–Löf type theory is, in one form or another, the theoretical basis for many of the computer proof assistants currently in use, such as Coq and Agda (cf. [3] and [5]), this promise of applications is of a practical, as well as theoretical, nature. This paper provides a precise indication of this connection between homotopy theory and logic; a more detailed discussion of these and further results will be given in [20]. (shrink)

REF is the statement that every stationary subset of a cardinal reflects, unless it fails to do so for a trivial reason. The main theorem, presented in Sect. 0, is that under suitable assumptions it is consistent that REF and there is a κ which is κ+n -supercompact. The main concepts defined in Sect. 1 are PT, which is a certain statement about the existence of transversals, and the “bad” stationary set. It is shown that supercompactness (and even the failure (...) of PT) implies the existence of non-reflecting stationary sets. E.g., if REF then for manyλ ⌝ PT(λ, ℵ1). In Sect. 2 it is shown that Easton-support iteration of suitable Levy collapses yield a universe with REF if for every singular λ which is a limit of supercompacts the bad stationary set concentrates on the “right” cofinalities. In Sect. 3 the use of oracle c.c. (and oracle proper—see [Sh-b, Chap. IV] and [Sh 100, Sect. 4]) is adapted to replacing the diamond by the Laver diamond. Using this, a universe as needed in Sect. 2 is forced, where one starts, and ends, with a universe with a proper class of supercompacts. In Sect. 4 bad sets are handled in ZFC. For a regular λ {δ<+ : cfδ<λ} is good. It is proved in ZFC that ifλ=cfλ>ℵ1 then {α<+ : cfα<λ} is the union of λ sets on which there are squares. (shrink)

Kaplan (1989a) insists that natural languages do not contain displacing devices that operate on character—such displacing devices are called monsters. This thesis has recently faced various empirical challenges (e.g., Schlenker 2003; Anand and Nevins 2004). In this note, the thesis is challenged on grounds of a more theoretical nature. It is argued that the standard compositional semantics of variable binding employs monstrous operations. As a dramatic first example, Kaplan’s formal language, the Logic of Demonstratives, is shown to contain monsters. For (...) similar reasons, the orthodox lambda-calculus-based semantics for variable binding is argued to be monstrous. This technical point promises to provide some far-reaching implications for our understanding of semantic theory and content. The theoretical upshot of the discussion is at least threefold: (i) the Kaplanian thesis that “directly referential” terms are not shiftable/bindable is unmotivated, (ii) since monsters operate on something distinct from the assertoric content of their operands, we must distinguish ingredient sense from assertoric content (cf. Dummett 1973; Evans 1979; Stanley 1997), and (iii) since the case of variable binding provides a paradigm of semantic shift that differs from the other types, it is plausible to think that indexicals—which are standardly treated by means of the assignment function—might undergo the same kind of shift. (shrink)

There is another sort of ‘defense’ of relativism that I mention in conclusion. Sometimes one finds the view that one is rightly punished for a crime only if they admit committing it, and that it was a crime — something wrongly done: ‘punishment conditional on confession’ is the rule proposed. It might seem that this would give impunity to a criminal hardy enough to deny the fact, or the evil, of her deed; so it would, unless it was also understood (...) that if a person was proved by accepted standards to be the perpetrator of an action agreed to be wrong, the opportunity to admit guilt would extend from open questioning through beating to exquisite torture until confession was extracted (cf. the Chinese customs reflected in the Judge Dee stories of Robert Van Gulik). More often, one finds the view that a person is not refuted unless he admits this, and a view is not refuted — and so is not properly dismissed — unless its proponents concede defeat. A similar view is that all really telling philosophical criticism must be internal or else non-neutral (a view we discussed above).If one can in principle produce a conceptual system from a list of all propositions by following the recipe: for any proposition P include P, or else include not-P, in S, then (providing one adds no constraints concerning consistency) there will be no proposition that will appear in all conceptual systems. If what it is for a proposition to be neutral is for it to appear in all conceptual systems, then no proposition is neutral. But of course, the same recipe that produces this result produces the result that the proposition (P) Some proposition is both true and false appears in some conceptual system which (since the denial of (P) appears in less than all systems and hence is not neutral) is (allegedly) none the worse for that. And the proposition (P1) Conceptual relativism is false appears in some conceptual systems which (since the denial of (P1) appears in less than all systems and hence is not neutral) is none the worse for that. But then what remains of the claim that conceptual relativism is true?Sometimes refuted is used in a person-independent manner: Proposition P is (and always was) refuted by the fact that F uses P is refuted in such a way that it does not entail There is someone who refuted P. Sometimes, of course, it is so used that P is refuted does have that entailment. Even in the latter case, refutation is an epistemological notion, and Person S is refuted does not entail S knows that S is refuted and is compatible with S believes that S is not refuted. The recommendation that we add a psychological component of ‘admits to’ to the epistemological notion ‘being refuted’ seems to have no other ground than the arbitrary one that if we do we shall then be able better to defend relativism.While the recipe for constructing conceptual systems suggested above may seem useful to a relativist — it gives one clear content to ‘neutral proposition’ — it has what must surely seem a defect to the relativist, namely that given it (even with consistency constraints added) there will be no translational incommensurability. For if P is contained in system S, then not-P is expressible in S, and conversely. And the recipe yields the result that for any proposition P, and any system S, S contains either P or else not-P.This, of course, brings out an ambiguity in ‘contains’. In one sense, a system ‘contains (1)’ whatever can be expressed in it. In another, it ‘contains (2)’ whatever, according to it, is true. If it is a complete system without suspense of judgment it contains (1) twice the propositions it contains (2). Further, a system contains (1) lots of propositions it (or its proponent) does not regard as true, and so the fact that a proposition P appears in system S does not mean that P favors S. One often at least can state the conditions of S's falsehood in S, and even prove in S that S is false, where “in” is used in the sense of “contains (1).”Sophisticated relativism, then, seems no more plausible, no more free from inconsistency, and no less open to devastating critique than are its less cultured relatives. Relativism, at least in the varieties discussed here, seems to live up to its unsavory reputation. Since not even translation incommensurability seems to entail lack of cognitive competitiveness, it seems that it will have to be admitted that, regarding apparent disagreement on basic matters — including fundamental religious disagreement — the appearance is also the reality. People do uneliminably disagree, and short of conversion or (what will seem from within the religious perspective in question) some other ‘failure in faith’ (e.g., coming to reject all religious views) will continue to do so. Whatever can be done in terms of common understanding and common humanitarian endeavors must be done without denying the many basic disagreements that there are. And whatever notion of inter-faith dialogue is other than espitemically defective will have to face that fact; for significant dialogue based on self-deception or on falsehood seems not a terribly promising enterprise. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 127.2 (2006) 305-309 [Access article in PDF] J. E. Lendon. Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. xii + 468 pp. 10 maps. 31 black-and-white figs. Cloth, $35. Necessity, just as a craft, always causes innovations to prevail, and although for a city at peace fixed norms are best, there is need of much contrivance for (...) those compelled by multiple circumstances to proceed. —Thucydides 1.73.3 War, culture, and change from Homer to Vegetius represent the focus of this work, presaged by the author's study of Caesarian battle narrative (ClAnt 18 [1999]: 273–329) and an interpretive review of some recent works (CJ 99 [2004]: 441–49). The reviewer must confess that his own work inspired much of this book's conceptual and factual content (e.g., 318, 401, 403, 411–12, 414, 415, 426, 432, 434–35) and that he provided Delphic responses (per epistulas electronicas) to a diligent inquirer, although he did not see individual chapters before publication and declined to read a final version of the manuscript. The author's own fertile imagination and vivid style animate these pages. Nestor could only advise Achilles.The work has its own historiographical ghosts. A cultural approach to war is now au courant, as a result of the clash of cultures in the so-called "War on Terror" (e.g., V. D. Hanson, Carnage and Culture [2001]) and Shannon French, The Code of the Warrior [2003], both missing from Lendon's bibliography) and as a reaction to the much imitated but seriously flawed "face-of-battle" approach to military history (e.g., John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture [2003]; cf. E.L. Wheeler, JRA 11 [1998]: 644–51 and Electrum 5 [2001]: 169–84 for the naïve foibles and excesses of "face-of-battle" studies). Lendon follows what is already a common theme of the cultural approach: culture, rather than technological progress and hardware, shapes the conduct of war.Older specters also lurk in the shadows: Jean-Pierre Vernant's structural anthropological school, which discovered that war happens and has ritualized aspects, warrior codes of conduct, and even rules (e.g., Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne, 1968); and Hans Delbrück (whom Lendon finds "perverse," 394), the progenitor of studying war within the total context of its time and society in his Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte (4 vols., 1920). Delbrück's twin principles of Quellenkritik and Sachkritik, basic analytical tools for detailed work, are not exploited in Lendon's sweeping interpretations.Lendon tiptoes carefully among the briars of previous work: war has rules [End Page 305] and culture shapes warrior ethics. A brilliant prologue (1–4), demonstrating from the Vietnam War how rules and culture continue to affect the American conduct of war, raises false hopes, as the rules-culture-conduct nexus is (regrettably) not pursued. But fancy footwork also escapes (for the most part) the face-of-battle morass: unit cohesion and its emphasis on "buddies" are wisely sidestepped in assessing combat behavior; the high road lies with the psychology of the warrior and the stimulus of competition, now a favorite Anglophone emphasis like initiation rites in the 1970s and transhumance in the 1980s. Unique, however, is that for Lendon culture in ancient warfare provides more than a context: culture is an active agent. In an age of limited technological advancement like Antiquity, change meant recreating the past and, as he argues, looking backward made Greek armies better, but eventually ruined Rome.Lendon attempts a very delicate balancing act. A curious (but not unique) editorial decision conceals the "Author's Note and Acknowledgments" at the end of this work. The note is aimed at the proverbial readership in never-never land (so popular with press editors): both ignorant and "adept" readers. A true confession yields that specialists will find nothing new about What or When; originality lies only with the Why of change. A promise of novelty and... (shrink)

We consider mainly the following version of set theory: “ZF+DC and for every λ,λℵ0\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\lambda, \lambda^{\aleph_0}}$$\end{document} is well ordered”, our thesis is that this is a reasonable set theory, e.g. on the one hand it is much weaker than full choice, and on the other hand much can be said or at least this is what the present work tries to indicate. In particular, we prove that for a sequence δ¯=⟨δs:s∈Y⟩,cf\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} (...) \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\overline{\delta} = \langle\delta_{s}: s \in Y\rangle, {\rm cf}}$$\end{document} large enough compared to Y, we can prove the pcf theorem with minor changes.We then deduce the existence of covering numbers and define and prove existence of a class of true successor cardinals. Using this we give some diagonalization arguments on Abelian groups, chosen as a characteristic case.We end by showing that some such consequences hold even in ZF above. (shrink)

While proper names in argument positions have received a lot of attention, this cannot be said about proper names in the naming construction, as in “Call me Al”. I argue that in a number of more or less familiar languages the syntax of naming constructions is such that proper names there have to be analyzed as predicates, whose content mentions the name itself (cf. “quotation theories”). If proper names can enter syntax as predicates, then in argument positions they should have (...) a complex structure, consisting of a determiner and its restriction, like common nouns (cf. “definite description theories of proper names”). Further consideration of the compositional semantics of proper names in the naming construction also shows that they have another argument slot, that of the naming convention. As a result, we will be able to account for the indexicality of proper names in argument positions and provide compositional semantics of complex and modified proper names (e.g., the famous detective Sherlock Holmes ). (shrink)

Our perception of external features comprises, among others, functional and phenomenological levels. At the functional level, the perceiver’s mind processes external features according to its own causal- functional organization. At the phenomenological level, the perceiver has consciousness of external features. The question of this paper is: How do the functional and the phenomenological levels of perception relate to each other? The answer I propose is that functional states of specifically perceptual attention constitute the necessary basis for the arising of consciousness (...) in a perceiver. -/- Widely studied within cognitive psychology, perceptual attention is still awaiting a thoroughgoing philosophical treatment. The paper presents and draws upon Anne Treisman’s feature-integration theory of attention (cf. A. Treisman & G. Gelade, “A Feature-Integration Theory of Attention,” Cognitive Psychology, 12, 1980. Pp. 97-136). According to this theory, attentional mechanisms are responsible for the binding of perceptual features into coherent and stable objects of perception. By itself, I will claim, the theory of feature integration does not allow a straightforward reduction of consciousness to the functional processing underlying it. However, on the basis of Treisman’s theory we can produce a methodological argument for endorsing the non-reductivist thesis that attentional states constitute the necessary basis for the arising of consciousness in a perceiver. The paper closes by presenting this argument, according to which the thesis is implied by a unified account of the common representational natures of attentional and conscious states. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to introduce the concept of Cognitive Fitness (CF), identify its key ingredients underpinning both real-time task performance and career longevity in high-risk occupations, and to canvas a holistic framework for their assessment, training, and augmentation. CF as a capacity to deploy neurocognitive resources, knowledge and skills to meet the demands of operational task performance, is likely to be multi-faceted and differentially malleable. A taxonomy of CF constructs derived from Cognitive Readiness (CR) and Mental fitness (...) (MF) literature maps into phases of operational cycles from foundational to advanced, mission-ready and recovery. Foundational cognitive attributes, such as attention, executive control and co-action, were hypothesized to be trainable at the initial Cognitive Gym phase. More advanced training targets at the CR phase included stress and arousal regulation, adaptability, teamwork, situation awareness (including detection, sense-making and prediction) and decision making (de-biasing and confidence calibration). The mission-ready training phase is focused on tolerances (to sleep loss, monotony, pain, frustration, uncertainty) and resistance (to distraction, deception or manipulation). Operational Augmentation phase relies on support tools such as decision aids and fatigue countermeasures, while the Recovery phase employs reflexive (e.g., mindfulness), and restorative practices (e.g., nutrition and sleep hygiene). The periodization of cognitive training in this cycle is hypothesized to optimize both real-time cognitive performance and the resilience that enables life-long thriving. One of the most promising avenues of validating this hypothesis is by developing an expert consensus on the key CF ingredients and their relative importance in high-performance settings. (shrink)

This dissertation is devoted to dual-process theories, widely discussed in the recent literature in cognitive science. The author argues for a significantly modified version of the account suggested by Samuels (2009), replacing the distinction between ‘Systems’ with a distinction between ‘Types of processes,’ which allows a critique of both the (only) modularist accounts and the accounts describing a deep difference between two systems each having their specificities (functional, phenomenological and neurological). In the account of dual-process theories developed here, the distinction (...) between ‘Types of processes’ is considered, a priori, only as a heuristic distinction allowing to better understand the mind and to explain some of its properties. The main idea defended in this dissertation is that cognitive processes should be distinguished by their position in a multidimensional conceptual space allowing researchers to consider all of the characteristics and peculiarities attributed to a process, which is preferable to accounts forcing the process into either ‘System’ or either ‘Type’ identified in the most influential approaches (cf. Evans, 2008). Once this research program is in place, it will become possible to revise the concepts used and the categories defined to ground anew some of the notions we find in the literature (‘module,’ ‘System 1 / 2,’ etc.). The argument is made in three steps: -/- 1) The first chapter aims at a clarification of the notion of ‘module’ commonly used in cognitive science. Against the accounts aiming at a weakening of the notion in order to classify all of the mind’s processes as modular, the author – following most notably Faucher and Poirier (2009) and Samuels (2006) – casts doubt on how this notion is used by many influential authors, particularly in evolutionary psychology (e.g. Barrett, Carruthers, Cosmides, Tooby). -/- 2) The objective of the second chapter is to present, examine and criticize many dual-process theories and to suggest that no theory currently discussed is adequate to describe the architecture of mind. The accounts, especially influent or representative, suggested by Stanovich (1999; 2004; 2009), by Evans (2008; 2009), by Lieberman (2007; 2009) and by Carruthers (2006; 2009), are examined. -/- 3) In the third chapter, the author criticizes the framework developed by Samuels (2009) before developing his own account of dual-process theories and discussing some of its advantages. (shrink)

A number of general points behind the story of this paper may be worth setting out separately, now that we have come to the end.There is perhaps one obvious omission to be addressed right away. Although the word “information” has occurred throughout this paper, it must have struck the reader that we have had nothing to say on what information is. In this respect, our theories may be like those in physics: which do not explain what “energy” is (a notion (...) which seems quite similar to “information” in several ways), but only give some basic laws about its behaviour and transmission.The eventual recommendation made here has been to use a broad type-theoretic framework for studying various more classical and more dynamic notions of proposition in their interaction. This is not quite the viewpoint advocated by many current authors in the area, who argue for a whole-sale switch from a ‘static’ to a ‘dynamic’ perspective on propositions. This is not the place, however, to survey the conceptual arguments for and against such a more radical move.This still leaves many questions about possible reductions from one perspective to another. For instance, it would seem that classical systems ought to serve as a ‘limiting case’, which should still be valid after procedural details of some cognitive process have been forgotten. There are various ways of implementing the desired correspondence: e.g. by considering extreme cases with ⫅ equal to identity, or, in the pure relational algebra framework by considering only pairs (x, x). What we shall want then are reductions of dynamic logics, in those special cases, to classical logic. But perhaps also, more sophisticated views are possible. How do we take a piece of ‘dynamic’ prose, remove control instructions and the like, and obtain a piece of ‘classical’ text, suitable for inference ‘in the light of eternity’?There is also a more technical side to the matter of ‘reduction’. By now, Logic has reached such a state of ‘inter-translatability’ that almost all known variant logics can be embedded into each other, via suitable translations. In particular, once an adequate semantic has been given for a new system, this usually induces an embedding into standard logic: as we know, e.g., for the case of Modal Logic. Like-wise, all systems of dynamic interpretation or inference proposed so far admit of direct embedding into an ordinary ‘static’ predicate logic having explicit transition predicates (cf. van Benthem 1988b). Thus, our moral is this. The issue is not whether the new systems of information structure or processing are essentially beyond the expressive resources of traditional logical systems: for, they are not. The issue is rather which interesting phenomena and questions will be put into the right focus by them.The next broad issue concerns the specific use of the perspective proposed here, vis-à-vis concrete proposals for information-oriented or dynamic semantics. The general strategy advocated here is to locate some suitable base calculus and then consider which ‘extras’ are peculiar to the proposal. For instance, this is the spirit in which modal S4 would be a base logic of information models, and intuitionistic logicthe special theory devoting itself to upward persistent propositions. Or, with the examples in Section 4.1, the underlying base logic is our relational algebra, whereas, say, ordinary updates then impose special properties, such as ‘idempotence’: $$xRy \Rightarrow yRy$$ Does this kind of application presuppose the existence of one distinguished base logic, of which all others are extensions? This would be attractive-and some form of relational algebra or linear logic might be a reasonable candidate. Nevertheless, the enterprise does not rest on this outcome. What matters is an increased sensitivity to the ‘landscape’ of dynamic logics, just as with the ‘Categorial Hierarchy’ in Categorial Grammar (cf. van Benthem 1989a, 1991) where the family of logics with their interconnections seems more important than any specific patriarch.Finally, perhaps the most important issue in the new framework is the possibility of new kinds of questions arising precisely because of its differences from standard logic. Notably, given the option of regarding propositions as programs, it will be of interest to consider systematically which major questions about programming languages now make sense inside logic too.EXAMPLE. Correctness. When do we have $$\left[\kern-0.15em\left[ \pi \right]\kern-0.15em\right](\left[\kern-0.15em\left[ A \right]\kern-0.15em\right]) \subseteq \left[\kern-0.15em\left[ B \right]\kern-0.15em\right]$$ for (s, t) propositions A, B and a dynamic (s, (s, t)) proposition π?Program Synthesis. Which dynamic proposition will take us from an information state satisfying A to one satisfying B? (This question needs refinement, lest there be trivial answers.)Determinism. Which propositions as programs are deterministic, in the sense of defining single-valued functions from states to states?Querying. What does it mean to ask for information in the present setting? (Again, individual types referring to e will be crucial here.)This is not merely an agenda for wishful thinking. Within Logic, there are various ways of introducing such concerns into semantics, especially, using tools from Automata Theory. (See van Benthem 1989c for further discussion of such computational perspectives in ‘cognitive programming’.)At least if one believes that ‘dynamics’ is of the essence in cognition (rather than a mere interfacing problem between the halls of eternal truth and the noisy streets of reality), the true test for the present enterprise is the development of a significant new research program not merely copying the questions of old. (shrink)

2) Philosophy in an important sense has no special subject-matter which stands to it as other subject-matters stand to other special disciplines…. What is characteristic of philosophy is not a special subject-matter, but the aim of knowing one’s way around with respect to the subject-matters of all the special disciplines. [370] [BB: It is not clear how this sits with the distinction between being a researcher (in a special discipline) and being an intellectual (caring about how it all fits together). (...) For, surely, not all intellectuals are philosophers, nor vice versa. One possibility is that he thinks that our research specialty is being intellectuals. But this is not plausible: sociologists, historians, journalist-pundits, culture critics, and so on have an equal claim to that distinction. WS might be thinking of philosophers as exclusively concerned with the cognitive enterprise, allowing intellectuals more generally to worry about, e.g., politics. But this is a pre- Hegelian way of thinking about things that is very implausible. I have my own take on this (cf. “Reason, Expression, and the Philosophic Enterprise”, Ch. 4 of RiP).]. (shrink)

Intentional action is, in some sense, non-accidental, and one common way action theorists have attempted to explain this is with reference to control. The idea, in short, is that intentional action implicates control, and control precludes accidentality. But in virtue of what, exactly, would exercising control over an action suffice to make it non-accidental in whatever sense is required for the action to be intentional? One interesting and prima facie plausible idea that we wish to explore in this paper is (...) that control is non-accidental in virtue of requiring knowledge – either knowledge-that or knowledge-how (e.g., Beddor and Pavese 2021; cf., Setiya 2008; 2012 and Habgood-Coote 2018). We review in detail some key recent work defending such knowledge-centric theories of control, and we show that none of these accounts holds water. We conclude with some discussion about how control opposes the sort of luck intentional action excludes without doing so by requiring knowledge (that- or how). (shrink)

Intentional action is, in some sense, non-accidental, and one common way action theorists have attempted to explain this is with reference to control. The idea, in short, is that intentional action implicates control, and control precludes accidentality. But in virtue of what, exactly, would exercising control over an action suffice to make it non-accidental in whatever sense is required for the action to be intentional? One interesting and prima facie plausible idea that we wish to explore in this paper is (...) that control is non-accidental in virtue of requiring knowledge—either knowledge-that or knowledge-how (e.g., Beddor and Pavese 2021; cf., Setiya 2008; 2012 and Habgood-Coote 2018). We review in detail some key recent work defending such knowledge-centric theories of control, and we show that none of these accounts holds water. We conclude with some discussion about how control opposes the sort of luck intentional action excludes without doing so by requiring knowledge (that- or how). (shrink)

The expression transuersa tuentibus hircis has been liable to misunderstanding. Conington, Sidgwick, and Page offer no comment; Perret is puzzled; Coleman explains ‘either literally “peeping out of the corner of their eyes” or figuratively “looking askance”; cf. Greek This was too much even for the lusty goats …’; others, e.g. Holtorf, detect humour in the words. A more realistic view was taken by some earlier editors, who saw in the sidelong looks of the goats a sign of envy and desire.

The literature on agreement in South Slavic generalizes that conjunct agreement in gender is only possible when all conjuncts are plural (e.g., Bošković, 2009 ). Marušič et al. (2015) and Arsenijević and Mitić (2016a, b ) attest a significant level of patterns contradicting this claim in elicited production experiments. They weaken the earlier generalization to a facilitating role of plural number for conjunct agreement in gender. However, the stimuli in the two respective experiments involve syncretism between the members of conjunction. (...) The syncretism removes the possibility – at Phonological Form at least – that by agreeing with one conjunct, the verb disagrees with the other. It is hence expected to result in a similar surface effect as the facilitation by plurals, which makes it a potential confound variable. We report and discuss the results of an experiment aimed to test both the effect of syncretism and the reality of the facilitating effects of plural number. The results of the experiment yield positive answers to both questions: syncretism is a facilitating factor, but plural number nevertheless has its facilitating effect too – as confirmed by the stimuli without syncretism. Since syncretism is a phenomenon in which phonological information plays a central role, our findings support syntactic models of agreement which extend to the interface with phonology. Moreover, our results reveal a double similarity of conjunct agreement with agreement attraction, in both showing a (stronger) attraction effect of plural number compared to singular, and in being sensitive to syncretism (cf. Badecker and Kuminiak, 2007 ; Malko and Slioussar, 2013 ; i.e., Bader and Meng, 2002 ; Hartsuiker et al., 2003 ; Slioussar, 2018 ). (shrink)

Some presuppositions seem to be weaker than others in the sense that they can be more easily neutralized in some contexts. For example some factive verbs, most notably epistemic factives like know, be aware, and discover, are known to shed their factivity fairly easily in contexts such as are found in (1). (1) a. …if anyone discovers that the method is also wombat-proof, I’d really like to know! b. Mrs. London is not aware that there have ever been signs erected (...) to stop use of the route… c. Perhaps God knows that we will never reach the stars…. (The examples in (1) are all naturally occurring ones, discovered by David Beaver with the aid of Google; cf. Beaver 2002, exx. 32, 43, and 51, respectively.) On the other hand some other factives, e.g. regret, matter, and be surprised, do not exhibit the same type of behavior: (2) a. If any of the students regrets behaving badly, they’ll let us know. b. It doesn’t matter that the chimpanzees escaped. c. Was Bill surprised that spinach was included? Unlike the examples in (1), those in (2) could not be used appropriately in contexts where the speaker was not assuming that the complement clause was true. Our main concern will be trying to find the cause of this difference. However, before we get to that, we will look more closely at the concept “presupposition” itself, as well as its close neighbor in the linguistic literature, “conventional implicature” (section 2), and also at various ways of getting rid of presuppositions (section 3). In section 4 we will investigate two possible explanations for differences in presupposition triggering – the “lexical alternative” approach of Abusch (2002, 2005), and a suggestion of Ladusaw’s involving detachability of presuppositions. The final section contains concluding remarks. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:REJOINDER TO BRUCE MARSHALL FREDERICK J. CROSSON University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, J.ndiana DISCUSSIONS HAVE to end sometime, and the differences in the reading of Aquinas by Bruce Marshall and myself will perhaps have sufficiently come into view if brief comments on several points are made. 1. In his second statement 1 Marshall seems to have shifted his argument. Originally he argued that a non-believer (e.g. a pagan (...) philosopher such as Aristotle) could not know or even properly refer to God.2 But in the subsequent statement, he seems to concede that, according to Aquinas, " That there is one God was known even by the philosophers, and is not a part of faith " and that " while some of the Gentiles knew God with respect to certain things which were knowable by reason, nevertheless they did not know him insofar as he is the Father...." (501; cf. 51213 ). Marshall seems now to hold that although that knowledge was possible at one time, it is not any longer: As Thomas reads Paul, then, the error (and specifically the idolatry) of the Gentiles overrides the knowledge of himself which God has given to them " from 1creation through the senses " ; in consequence the further possibility of this knowledge... is withdrawn by God. With regard to the Gentiles, including their sapientes-the philosophers with demonstrative arguments-the denial of knowledge overrides the initial ascription of it (512, my emphasis). 1 Bruce D. Marshall, " Thomas, Thomisms, and Truth", The Thomist 56 (1992) pp. 499-524. His original article was in ibid. 53 (1989), pp. 353-402. Page references in the text or footnotes without other citation will be to these articles. 2 " The person whose discourse does not cohere with the broader norms of Christian belief is not even talking about God, and so cannot possibly know or refer to him " (378-379), emphasis mine. 299 300 FREDERICK J. CROSSON I confess to a certain difficulty in understanding what "overrides " means here: cancels? contradicts? blots out? In any case, it seems that it was, at some time and for some non-Christian thinkers (e.g. Aristotle), possible to come to the knowledge of God's existence by reason, but that Marshall interprets Aquinas as saying that that knowledge is no longer even possible. 2. Marshall's general claim is that Aquinas must be read as holding a coherentist notion of revealed truth, so that a pagan and a Christian cannot mean the same thing the word ' God '. But Aquinas says exactly the opposite: Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the nature of God as he is in himself, but each knows him by some understanding (aliquam rationein ) of causality or excellence or remotion... Consequently a pagan can take this name God, when he says an idol is God, in the same way that a Catholic does in saying an idol is not God.3 3. Again and again, Marshall returns to the claim that, according to Aquinas, " In simple things any failure of knowledge (defectus cognitionis) is in fact a total lack of knowledge " (382) ;4 he cites the Commentary on John, in which Thomas declares... while it is possible for composite things to be known in part and to be unknown in part, if simple things are not grasped completely, they are not known (501). In Marshall's view, these claims about the knowledge of simple forms exclude the possibility of any adequation between the conclusion of a pagan philosopher's demonstration and the Divine esse: "... the defectus cognitionis of which Thomas speaks in II-II, 2, 2, ad 3, entails not a partial, but a total lack of corres:. pondence between the mind and God" (384). Marshall seems to read such statements as if they made the following objection: a Summa Theologiae I, q. 3, a. 10, ad 5: Dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque catholicus neque paganus cognoscit; sed uterque cognoscit earn secumdum aliquam rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis... Et secundum hoc in eadem significatione accipere potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum. (shrink)

It is widely supposed that, in Hilary Putnam’s phrase, there are no “ready-made objects” (Putnam 1982; cf. Putnam 1981, Ch. 3). Instead the objects we consider real are partly of our own making: we carve them out of the world (or out of experience). The usual reason for supposing this lies in the claim that there are available to us alternative ways of “dividing reality” into objects (to quote the title of Hirsch 1993), ways which would afford us every bit (...) as much practical and cognitive mastery as we now possess. Hence there is no warrant for supposing that the objects recognized by such alternative schemes are any less real than the objects we actually consider real—unless we are to appeal to a “God’s-eye perspective”, which virtually no one wants to do. The reasonable conclusion, many philosophers suppose, is that any system of objects exists only relative to a particular conceptual scheme or system of predicates. Our system of objects is, in this sense, partly of our own making. But this claim should not be heard as a reaffirmation of the idealism of Fichte or Husserl. It is more accurate to take it merely as a claim about sameness and difference among the objects of the world. It is the claim that sameness and difference, whether at the level of kinds or of individual objects, do not obtain mind-independently, but only relative to a conceptual scheme or predicate system (see, e.g., Putnam 1981, pp. 53-54). That is, whether two objects are of the same kind, and whether one and the same individual object now exists at such-and-such.. (shrink)

Generalizing Woodin’s extender algebra, cf. e.g. Steel (in: Kanamori (ed) Handbook of set theory, Springer, Berlin, 2010), we isolate the long extender algebra as a general version of Bukowský’s forcing, cf. Bukovský (Fundam Math 83:35–46, 1973), in the presence of a supercompact cardinal.

Artykuł ma na celu wskazanie filozoficznych źródeł zarówno akcesu Martina Heideggera do ruchu nazistowskiego, jak i późniejszego zerwania przez myśliciela z zaangażowaniem politycznym. Drogę Heideggera do i od narodowego socjalizmu należy uchwycić nie tylko poprzez biografię filozofa, lecz przede wszystkim na szerszym tle procesu kształtowania się jego rozumienia polityki jako obszaru bytu wydzielonego i zagospodarowanego przez zachodnią metafizykę, co stanowi przejaw wypełnienia istoty metafizyki jako zapomnienia o byciu. Filozofię Heideggera wielokrotnie diagnozowano (por. np. Löwith, Adorno) jako głęboko powiązaną ze światopoglądem (...) faszystowskim; przyjęta tutaj linia argumentacji podkreśla, przeciwnie, integralność etycznej linii argumentacji dzieła Heideggera, akcentującej w odniesieniu do polityki jej charakter eksploatacji bytu, podobnie jak uniformizacji człowieka i przemiany go w zasób. Konkluzja odsłania zatem głęboko antyfaszystowski wydźwięk pism Heideggera z lat 1936 – 1946 i podkreśla zarazem niepokojącą indyferencję w stosunku Heideggera do totalitarnych i nietotalitarnych systemów politycznych. Overcoming Metaphysics, Overcoming Politics. Martin Heidegger’s Path to and from National Socialism: This paper aims to equally pinpoint the philosophical origins of Martin Heidegger’s entry into the Nazi movement and the thinker’s subsequent break with political involvement. Heidegger’s path to and from National Socialism should be apprehended not only through the philosopher’s biography but, above all, within the broader framework of the process of the development of his understanding of politics as an area of being set apart and accommodated by Western metaphysics, which marks the fulfillment of the essence of metaphysics as a forgetting of being. Heidegger’s philosophy has been repeatedly diagnosed (cf., e.g., Löwith, Adorno) as deeply linked to the fascist worldview; the line of reasoning taken up in this paper insists, on the contrary, on the integrity of the ethical reasoning behind Heidegger’s work, which emphasizes, concerning politics, its character of exploiting being, in the same way as it uniformizes people and transforms them into a resource. The conclusion, therefore, reveals the profoundly anti-fascist overtones of Heidegger’s writings from 1936–1946 and, simultaneously, underscores a worrying indifference to Heidegger’s relationship to totalitarian and non-totalitarian political systems. (shrink)